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EUROPEAN UNION DIRECTIVE ON PERSONAL PRIVACY
RIGHTS AND COMPUTERIZED INFORMATION*
RoSAIuo IMPERIALI D'AFFLrITO**
I. INTRODUCTION
IN the last fifteen years, domestic and international European
lawmakers have attempted to address the protection of individu-
als ("data subjects") with regard to automatic processing of per-
sonal data. Opened for signature on January 28, 1981, the
European Convention for the Protection of Individuals With Re-
gard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data ("Convention")
spurred many European nations to take legislative action within
their borders on this subject.1 Contingent upon a particular state's
proper ratification of and adherence to the Convention, these new
laws opened the door for local implementation of the Convention's
principles. 2 Today, despite the lack of any real supranational legal
coordination, European national laws on data privacy are essentially
the same, as they are based upon the Convention's principles.
Because most European states' data privacy laws arise from a
* This Recent Development is available at the Villanova Law Review home
page at http://vls.law.vill.edu/academic/jd/journals/law-review/Volume_41/.
** Rosario Imperiali d'Afflitto currently practices as an attorney-at-law, spe-
cializing in business, copyright, computer and European antitrust law. He re-
ceived his Law Degree from the University of Naples (summa cum laude) and
formerly served as Senior Counsel for IBM and ISSC Italia, a wholly owned IBM
subsidiary.
1. European Convention for the Protection of Individuals With Regard to the
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, signed on Jan. 28, 1981, Europ. T.S. 108, 20
I.L.M. 317 [hereinafter Convention] (entered into force Oct. 1, 1985).
2. Of the European Union member states, only Greece and Italy have not yet
ratified the Convention. The Italian Parliament, with law n.98 of February 21,
1989, authorized the ratification of the Convention; entry into force, however, will
be subject to adoption by the Parliament of "the necessary measures in its domestic
law to give effect to the basic principles for data protection set out" in the Conven-
tion (Article 4(1)). Convention, supra note 1, art. 4(1). Thus, a data privacy law is
still to be enacted in Italy. For the same reason, Italy has not been able to imple-
ment the Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Com-
mon Borders among the signatory states, despite the fact that this treaty has been
ratified by law 388 of September 30, 1993. See Schengen Agreement on the Grad-
ual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders, June 14, 1985, 30 I.L.M. 68
[hereinafter Schengen Agreement]. A condition precedent to the Schengen
Agreement is, in fact, adoption of a national law implementing the Convention.
See Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement of June 14, 1985 on the Grad-
ual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders, June 19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 84
[hereinafter Schengen Convention].
(305)
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common source,3 the need for a European Directive on this subject
may not have been self-evident. Three continuing problems, how-
ever, showed the underlying need for a Directive in this field. Spe-
cifically, a Directive was needed to address: (1) the divergences still
present in the national laws of the European Union (E.U.) member
states; (2) the absence of specific legislation on this matter with re-
gard to at least two member states, Greece and Italy; and (3) the
absence of a supranational supervisory body.
In recognition of this need, on July 24, 1995, the E.U. Council
approved the Directive. On October 24, following the co-decision
procedure, the Directive was signed by the Presidents of both the
E.U. Council and Parliament. Member states now have until Octo-
ber 23, 1998 to adopt the Directive into their national legal systems.
This Recent Development discusses Directive No. 95/46/EC of
the E.U. "on the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data," adopted by the E.U. Parliament and Council of Ministers on
October 24, 1995 ("Directive"). 4 After explaining the need for the
Directive, this article analyzes the Directive's general principles and
scope. This article also details the Convention principles that mem-
ber states must adopt domestically without modifications, as well as
those principles member states may exercise discretion in adopting.
3. The following table summarizes the data privacy laws of E.U. member
states.
E.U. Date Date Convention Registration Manual Legal
Member State enacted in force ratified Notification Records Persons
Austria 10/18/78 01/01/80 Yes All data Yes Yes
Belgium 12/08/92 04/01/93 No Some data Yes No
Denmark 06/08/78 01/01/79 Yes Some data Yes Yes
Finland 02/04/87 01/01/88 Yes Some data Yes No
France 01/06/78 01/01/80 Yes All data Yes Yes
Germany 01/27/77 01/01/79 Yes Some data Yes No
Ireland 07/13/88 04/19/89 Yes Some data No No
Luxembourg 03/31/79 10/01/79 Yes All data No Yes
Netherlands 12/28/88 07/01/90 Yes Some data Yes No
Norway 06/09/78 01/01/80 Yes Some data Yes Yes
Spain 10/29/92 02/01/93 Yes All data No No
Sweden 05/13/73 07/01/74 Yes All data No No
U.K. 07/12/84 11/11/87 Yes All data No No
STEWART DRESNER, PRIVACy LAws & BUSINESS (1994). For a discussion of the situa-
tion in Italy and Greece, see supra note 2.
4. Council Directive No. 95/46/EC 1995 OJ. (L 281) (Nov. 23, 1995) [here-
inafter Directive]. The first proposal of the E.U. Commission on this subject dates
back to the year 1990. See Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Protec-
tion of Individuals in Relation to the Processing of Personal Data COM/90/314,
1990 O.J. (C 277) (Nov. 5, 1990) [hereinafter Proposal].
[Vol. 41: p. 305
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II. THE NEED FOR A EUROPEAN UNION DIRECTIVE ON
DATA PRIVACY
A. Divergences Still Existing Among European National Laws on
Data Privacy
In addition to jeopardizing the harmonization of member
states' legislation on important matters according to the Treaty of
Rome, 5 divergences still existing among the various national laws6
may also prevent transborder data flow, thus creating a barrier to
the four basic freedoms of movement set forth in the Treaty.7 As a
result, these divergences also impinge upon the Directive. The
third "Whereas" to the Directive asserts that "the establishment and
functioning of an internal market in which, in accordance with Arti-
cle 7A of the Treaty of Rome, the free movement of goods, persons,
services and capital is ensured require.., that personal data should
be able to flow freely from one Member State to another."8 Be-
cause of the reciprocity principle present in almost all E.U. member
states' data privacy laws, the differing national systems of protection
may prevent this free flow of personal data. 9 According to the reci-
procity principle, the state from which data will be transmitted can
prohibit the flow if the receiving state does not guarantee adequate
protection.10
5. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
6. For example, while United Kingdom law on data privacy refers only to au-
tomated personal data, corresponding Belgian, French, German and Spanish laws
also include manually recorded personal data structured according to specific cri-
teria. At the same time, German law does not discriminate between personal data
in general and "sensitive" data (i.e., those "personal data revealing racial or ethnic
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union member-
ship, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life"). France, the
United Kingdom, Spain and other E.U. member states, however, do regulate "sen-
sitive" data more restrictively. Finally, Austrian, Luxembourg, French, Danish and
Norwegian laws also protect legal entities' right to privacy, thus including in the
definition of data any information relating to an identified legal person. The vast
majority of the remaining E.U. member states regulate only data related to natural
persons.
7. The Treaty of Rome states that "[t]he internal market shall comprise of an
area without internal frontiers in which the free movements of goods, persons,
services and capitals is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty."
Treaty of Rome, supra note 5, art. 7a.
8. Directive, supra note 4, at 3d "Whereas."
9. Id. at 7th & 8th "Whereas."
10. See id. at 57th "Whereas." The Directive further states that "in order to
remove the obstacles to flows of personal data, the level of protection of the rights
and freedoms of individuals with regard to the processing of such data must be
equivalent in all Member States." Id. at 8th "Whereas."
1996]
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B. Absence of Specific Legislation on Data Privacy in Greece and Italy
The absence of specific legislation on data privacy in Greece
and Italy prevents standard implementation of the Convention
among all E.U. member states. In addition, it impedes harmoniza-
tion of member states' legislation and hinders the free flow of data
over borders." Accordingly, the need to have all member states
implement domestically common rulings on data privacy also justi-
fied the adoption of an E.U. Directive.
C. Creation of a Supranational Supervisory Body
The creation of a supervisory body at a supranational level
would contribute to the harmonization, consulting and sharing of
experiences among the National Supervisory Authorities on Data
Privacy. This would further harmonization at an administrative
level, parallel to that sought by the European Council on a legisla-
tive level through the Directive.12
III. PRINCIPLES AND SCOPE OF THE DIRECTIVE
On July 24, 1995, the E.U. Council contradicted experts' tim-
ing forecasts and adopted Directive No. 95/46/EC. Most commen-
tators predicted, however, that it would then stall between the
Parliament and the Council.13 It did not, however, and on October
11. The Italian Parliament's authorization (per law n.388 of September 30,
1993) of the ratification of the Schengen Agreement, of June 14, 1985, further
stresses the urgency of enacting a data privacy law in Italy. The presence of a
national law on data privacy protection is, in fact, a prerequisite for the above
ratification. For a further discussion of the situation in Italy, see supra note 2.
12. The Directive states that "at a Community level, a Working Party on the
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data must be
set up and be completely independent in the performance of its functions; . . .
having regard to its specific nature, it must advise the Commission and, in particu-
lar, contribute to the uniform application of the national rules adopted pursuant
to this Directive." Directive, supra note 4, at 65th "Whereas." It further states that
the Working Party "shall be composed of a representative of the supervisory
authority... designated by each Member State and of a representative of the au-
thority established ... for the Community institutions and bodies, and of a repre-
sentative of the [E.U.J Commission." Id. art. 29.
13. The Directive, in its final version, is the result of a second proposal from
the E.U. Commission, presented on October 16, 1992. See 1992 O.J. (C 311) (Nov.
27, 1992). The first proposal is dated July 27, 1990. See Proposal COM/90/314,
1990 O.J. (C 277) (Nov. 5, 1990). The Parliament's first reading took place in the
Spring of 1992. On February 20, 1995, the parties reached a common position. In
June, at a second reading, the Parliament presented six amendments to the com-
mon position, which were subsequently accepted by the Commission. Seeking to
avoid the lengthy procedure prescribed by Article 189B of the Treaty, which would
apply if there were disagreement, and relying upon the amendments' non-funda-
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24, Parliament adopted the Directive. The details of the Directive
are discussed below.
A. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy
Through the Directive, the E.U. legislator intended to ensure
that personal data would flow within the Union in compliance with
the fundamental freedoms of individual privacy. The Directive
moves directly from its first consideration, that "the establishment
and functioning of an internal market.., require [s] not only that
personal data should be able to flow freely from one Member State
to another," to a second consideration, "that the fundamental
rights of individuals should [also] be safeguarded."1 4 The entire
rulings seek to balance these two seemingly contradictory interests:
(1) the free flow of personal data subject to processing; and (2) the
fundamental freedoms and rights of individuals.
The Directive's goal is to promote harmonization of member
states' data privacy legislation and, thereby, the free flow of data.
To achieve this goal, the E.U. legislator specified a set of rules
which must be implemented by the member states in their legal
systems "as is," and also granted member states a margin for maneu-
ver in such implementation. According to the principle of harmo-
nization, member states' national legislation should be based upon
the compulsory rules.
B. Directive Inconsistency
The Directive presents a seeming inconsistency. The Council
and Commission generally pursue legislative harmonization among
member states' legislation by applying a minimal approach that,
while forcing member states to implement the Directive's rules do-
mestically, leaves the states free to establish additional or more re-
strictive rules on the same subject. By leaving the member states
free to legislate in the manner they deem most adequate, the Coun-
cil seeks not only to accomplish harmonization, but also to consider
national sovereignty.1 5
mental nature, the Council accepted the modifications and adopted the Directive
on July 24, 1995.
14. Directive, supra note 4, at 3d "Whereas."
15. The primary objective of the Convention is to establish:
basic principles for data protection. Each Party should take the necessary
steps to give effect to this "common core" in its domestic legislation....
Moreover, the "common core" will result in very close harmonization be-
tween the laws of the Contracting States and hence decrease the possibil-
ity of conflicts of law or jurisdiction.
Draft Explanatory Report on the Draft Convention for the Protection of Individu-
1996] 309
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In the case of data privacy, the Directive's criteria offer the
highest coverage or protection, as compared to both consumer pro-
tection legislation and certain member states' constitutional human
rights provisions. 16 According to the Council, this level of protec-
tion reflects that:
[T] he object of the national laws on the processing of per-
sonal data is to protect fundamental rights and freedoms,
notably the right to privacy, which is recognized both in
Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and in the
general principles of Community law;.., for that reason,
the approximation of [these] laws must not result in any
lessening of the protection they afford but must, on the
contrary, seek to ensure a high level of protection in the
Community.17
The Council further states that "the principles of the protec-
tion of the rights and freedoms of individuals, notably the right to
privacy, which are contained in this Directive, give substance to and
amplify those contained in the ... Convention."' 8 Accordingly, na-
tional laws offering the highest protection would achieve two main
objectives: (1) ensuring adequate protection to the right of privacy
as usually ruled out by national constitutions; and (2) guaranteeing
the elimination of barriers to the free flow of personal data through
the harmonization of data privacy protection among member
states.
Despite its decision to afford data privacy a different level of
protection through the Directive, the Council has continued to
leave the states free to some extent to vary the degree of protection.
This, however, creates an inconsistency: flexibility and harmoniza-
tion are not always compatible concepts.
This incongruity is positively stated in the Directive's ninth
"Whereas," which states that:
als With Regard to Automatic Processing Personal Data, 19 I.L.M. 282, 299 (1980)
[hereinafter Explanatory Report to Convention].
16. See id. at 300 (concluding, following study of Committee of Ministers, that
"the present law [consisting of European Human Rights Convention and domestic
law] gave insufficient protection to individual privacy and other rights and inter-
ests of individuals with regard to automated data banks").
17. Directive, supra note 4, at 10th "Whereas" (discussing European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221).
18. Id. at 11th "Whereas."
310 [Vol. 41: p. 305
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[T] he Member States will be left a margin for manoeuver
[sic] . . . [and] therefore be able to specify in their na-
tional law the general conditions governing the lawfulness
of data processing ... [I]n doing so the Member States
shall strive to improve the protection currently provided
by their legislation.., within the limits of this margin for
manoeuver[sic] and in accordance with Community law, dis-
parities could arise in the implementation of the Directive, and
this could have an effect on the movement of data within a Mem-
ber State as well as within the Community.19
Thus, under the Directive, single member states may continue to
rule independently in areas of importance.
A number of factors could lead to disharmonious national leg-
islation. For example, national laws could diverge over the: (1) in-
clusion/exclusion of personal or household processing from the
legal protective system; (2) protection of manual records as part of
data privacy law; (3) inclusion/exclusion of legal persons among
the data subjects legally safeguarded; and (4) means of balancing
individual rights with legitimate business interests. These factors in-
dicate that divergences at the E.U. level in this field could persist.
The room for discrepancy left by the Directive, however, does
not seem to affect free transborder data flow among E.U. member
states. The general principle stated in paragraph 2 of Article 1 pre-
vents "Member States [from either] . . . restrict[ing or] pro-
hibit[ing] the free flow of personal data amongst Member States for
reasons connected with the protection afforded under [the
Directive] .20
19. Id. at 9th "Whereas" (emphasis added).
20. Id. art. 1, para. 2. The first area of possible discrepancy is over "the
processing of data carried out by a natural person in the exercise of activities which
are exclusively personal or domestic, such as correspondence and the holding of
records of addresses" which the Directive states should be excluded by the applica-
tion of data privacy provisions. Id. at 12th "Whereas" & art. 3, para. 2.
The second area of discrepancy is over manual records, which the Directive
limits to cases where the data "form[s] part of a filing system or are intended to
form part of a filing system." Id. art. 3, para. 1; see also id. at 10th "Whereas." The
Directive defines personal data filing system or filing system as, "any structured set
of personal data which are accessible according to specific criteria." Id. art. 2(c).
As per the Directive, a manual record is subject to data privacy provisions when it is
judged as a filing system "structured according to specific criteria relating to indi-
viduals, allowing easy access to the personal data in question." Id. at 27th
"Whereas." Also, in this case, "the different criteria for determining the constitu-
ents of a structured set of personal data, and the different criteria governing access
to such a set, may be laid down by each Member State." Id. In any case, however,
"files or sets of files ... which are not structured according to specific criteria, shall
under no circumstances fall within the scope of this Directive." Id.
1996]
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C. Remedies
The Directive seeks to give individuals certain remedies for ac-
tual privacy protection. One of these remedies, however, the right
to block data, is problematic. Although the Directive fairly grants
individuals the rights to rectify and to erase data processed in viola-
tion of the Directive, the Directive's third sanction-the right to
block data-seems disproportionate. In most instances, in order to
block data the whole data bank, as well as the whole processing
activity, must also be blocked. This is especially true given that to-
day's data banks are generally interconnected.
Second, the possible consequences of such an action extend
far beyond the scope of both the legitimate safekeeping of individ-
ual rights and the remedies necessary to support such protection.
It is difficult to contemplate violations unremediable through both
the sanctions of data rectification and erasure, and somehow re-
quiring recourse to the potentially over-reaching remedy of data
blocking. In addition, the blocking of data is conceived as a rem-
edy in cases where data is incomplete. Despite a few attempts at
textual interpretation, however, the Directive's definition of incom-
pleteness remains vague.2 1
The third area of discrepancy is over the notion of "data subject" being "an
identified or identifiable natural person" with the consequent exclusion of the data
related to legal persons from the scope of the Directive. Id. art. 2(a) (emphasis
added). The European legislator, however, seems unlikely to modify the existing
national "legislation concerning the protection of legal persons with regard to the
processing of data which concern them." Id. at 24th "Whereas" (emphasis added).
Because the legislation "is not affected by the Directive," divergence on this matter
among the member states remains unsolved. Id.
The fourth area of discrepancy-"the circumstances in which personal data
may be used or disclosed to a third party in the context of the legitimate ordinary
business activities of companies and other bodies"-is left for member states to
determine, "in order to maintain a balance between the interests involved while
guaranteeing effective competition." Id. at 30th "Whereas;" see also id. art. 7(f).
The fifth area of discrepancy involves whether "rights of access and informa-
tion" may be imposed by member states "in the interest of the data subject or so as
to protect the rights and freedoms of others." Id. at 42d "Whereas;" see also id. art.
13. For the same reason, by virtue of the provisions of Community law, member
states may derogate from the provisions of the Directive concerning the right of
access, the right of information and the quality of data. Id. at 42d & 44th
"Whereas;" see also id. art. 13.
The sixth area of discrepancy is over the granting of "exemptions from the
obligation to notify and simplification of the notification required may be pro-
vided for by Member States" seeking to "avoid unsuitable administrative formali-
ties .... [and] in cases where processing is unlikely to adversely affect the rights
and freedoms of data subjects." Id. at 49th "Whereas;" see also id. art. 18, paras. 3-5.
Although granting member states the opportunity to rule out few exceptions and
derogations is a flexible approach that, with regard to this complex field, is proper
and welcome, the same cannot be said for other points.
21. The criterion to judge the adequacy of the completeness of the data con-
[Vol. 41: p. 305
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In conclusion, while the Directive seeks to safeguard individual
rights through permitting data rectification and erasure, the Direc-
tive goes too far by permitting data blocking. Data blocking is an
excessive remedy because of its technical implications and possibly
disruptive effects on a concern's entire business activity.
D. Scope of the Directive
The scope of the Directive's protection is delineated by three
elements: (1) natural persons; (2) data identifying; and (3) data
processing.
1. Protection of Natural Persons
The Directive protects the fundamental rights of individuals by
substantiating and amplifying Convention principles. After lengthy
discussion within the E.U., however, legal persons were excluded
from the scope of the Directive's protection. The Directive, how-
ever, points out that it will have no effect upon existing legislation
protecting legal persons with regard to data processing which con-
cerns them.
2. Data Which May Identify an Individual
The Directive's protection is limited to "personal data," de-
fined as any information concerning a natural person, identified or
identifiable, even if through sounds and images.22 The Preamble
to the Directive makes the only reference to sounds and images; no
mention is made in its operative provisions. As a result, there is no
specific exception or guidance, of the type that a prior data sub-
ject's consent provision would provide, for personal data identifica-
tion techniques such as surveillance cameras installed by banks,
digitized signatures or recording systems.
a. "Sensitive" Data
Certain personal data merits higher protection because it "re-
tained in Article 6(d)'s reference to "the purposes for which [the data] were col-
lected or for which they are further processed" is not sufficiently clear to
adequately delimit this concept. See id. art. 6(d).
22. Id. art. 2(a). The Directive defines "personal data" as "any information
relating to an identified or identifiable person." Id. The Directive further defines
an "identifiable person" as "one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in
particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors spe-
cific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity."
Id. Therefore, data rendered in such a way that the data subject is no longer iden-
tifiable falls outside the scope of protection. Id.
1996]
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veal [s one's] racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or
philosophical beliefs, trade union membership," health matters or
sex life.2 3 Accordingly, the Directive compels member states to pro-
hibit the processing of such data. A few exceptions to this prohibi-
tion exist, the most notable of which rests upon the explicit consent
of the data subject. 24
b. Manual Files
With regard to the nature of records falling under data privacy
protection, it is worth noting that the Convention per se excluded
"manual files" from its scope.2 5 The Directive, however, includes
manual files in its scope,2 6 although limiting applicability to data
contained, or intended to be contained, in a "filing system."27 The
Directive's inclusion of manual processings has raised substantial
criticism.2 8 Article 3, paragraph 1, however, includes a concept of
23. Id. art. 8, para. 1.
24. Id. art. 8, para. 2. Exceptions to the general prohibition of processing are
when: (1) the consent of the data subject is given; (2) it is necessary for the con-
troller to carry his obligations and rights in the field of employment law; (3) it is
necessary to protect the data subject or a third person where the subject is incapa-
ble of giving consent; (4) legitimate activities within appropriate guarantees by a
non-profit body are directed solely at members and data is not disclosed to third
parties without consent; (5) the data subject makes the processing public or it is
necessary to do so because of a legal claim; (6) the processing is related to medical
purposes; and (7) member states exercise their discretion. Id.
25. "The Contracting Parties undertake to apply this Convention to auto-
mated data files and automatic processing of personal data .... Draft Conven-
tion for the Protection of Individuals With Regard to Automatic Processing of
Personal Data, 19 I.L.M. 282, 284, art. 3, para. 1 (1980). Further, the Introduction
to the Explanatory Report states that "[t]he object of this Convention is ... the
legal protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal in-
formation relating to them .... Compared with manual files, automated files have
a vastly superior storage capability and offer possibilities for a much wider variety
of transactions, which they can perform at high speed." Explanatory Report of
Convention, supra note 15, at 299, intro., para. 1.
26. "[T] he protection of individuals must apply as much to automatic process-
ing of data as to manual processing; ... the scope of this protection must not in
effect depend on the techniques used, otherwise this would create a serious risk of
circumvention." Directive, supra note 4, at 27th "Whereas."
27. For example, this would include "any structured set of personal data
which are accessible according to specific criteria" and easily accessible as per Arti-
cle 2(c). Id. art. 2(c). The Directive states that "nonetheless, as regards manual
processing, this Directive covers only filing systems, not unstructured files." Id. at
27th "Whereas."
28. It has been noted that the definition of "personal data filing system" is
vague. The Directive defines a "personal data filing system" as "any structured set
of personal data which are accessible according to specific criteria, whether cen-
tralized, decentralized or dispersed on a functional or geographical basis." Id. art.
2(c). Although it probably does not refer only to card index-type systems, it may
refer to all correspondence files. In the latter case, the consequences in terms of
administrative burdens (e.g., from notification to the Authority), problematic im-
10
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potentiality that extends the scope of the law even further, adding
an element of interpretative uncertainty as to what information is
"intended to form part of a filing system."29 Although the Directive
allows member states to establish "the different criteria for deter-
mining the constituents of a structured set of personal data, and the
different criteria governing access to such a set," it also emphasizes
that "files or sets of files ... which are not structured according to
specific criteria, shall under no circumstances fall within [its
protection] "30
3. Processing Activity
Not all personal data remains within the scope of the Directive;
rather, its protection extends only to personal data subject to
processing, including both automated and manual operations.
Specifically, the Directive does not cover the processing of personal
data: (1) concerning public security and criminal law; and (2) by a
natural person in the course of a purely personal or household
activity.3 1
E. The Main Principles of Data Privacy Protection
Three types of principles potentially promote data privacy pro-
tection. First, data privacy may be protected by establishing an in-
dependent and specialized authority, with supervising, intervening
and consulting duties. Second, data privacy may be protected by a
series of obligations imposed on the persons responsible for
processing32 who can then be subject to sanctions in case of a viola-
tion. Such obligations relate to: (1) information to the data sub-
ject; (2) data quality; (3) technical security; (4) notification to the
Supervisory Authority; and (5) qualifying factors of processing.
Combined, these five factors guarantee legitimacy of processing,
protection of data and public control over processing activity.
Third, data privacy may be protected by the granting of exclu-
sive rights to data subjects, such as the rights to: (1) be informed
plementation (e.g., from honoring the data subject's right to access, and con-
forming existing or new files to the new provisions of law) are significant.
29. Id. art. 3, para. 1.
30. Id. at 27th "Whereas."
31. Id. art. 3, para. 2.
32. The Directive refers to these persons as "controllers." See id. art. 2(d). A
controller is defined as the individual or entity which "determines the purposes
and means of the processing of personal data." Id. The Directive also recognized
an individual or entity, known as a "processor," that "processes personal data on
behalf of the controller." Id. art. 2(e).
3151996]
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(i.e., know that automated personal data exists); (2) consult the
data (i.e., know the content of the information); and (3) request
corrections or, in specific cases, to object to the processing (i.e., a
remedy in cases of inappropriate or incorrect information). These
rights allow verification of data processing for compliance with data
privacy rights.
F. The Processor's Obligations
The Directive imposes obligations on the data controller that
are connected to both the exercise of the data subject's rights and
the relation of the means (i.e., specific obligations) to the scope
(i.e., extent of privacy protection). In other words, the obligations
are meant to fit the purpose of actually protecting the rights of data
subjects. For this reason, the Directive seeks to avoid "unsuitable
administrative formalities."33 Moreover, both the Convention and
the Directive determine the validity of exemptions and simplifica-
tions according to their impact upon actual data privacy protec-
tion.34 Consequently, when exercising their discretionary powers,
national legislators should make a practical and effective data pri-
vacy protection system the priority.
1. Information to the Data Subject
Legitimate personal data processing systems require data con-
trollers to inform data subjects of a data processing related to them
and also of the main features of the data collecting operations.
Data controllers must do so upon collection of the data, or, if not
collected directly from the data subject, upon recording the data.
This obligation to provide information is subject to few
exceptions.35
2. Data Quality
According to the Directive, personal data must be: (1)
processed fairly and lawfully; (2) collected for specified, explicit
and legitimate purposes; (3) adequate, relevant and not excessive
in relation to the purposes for which they are collected; (4) accu-
rate and, where necessary, kept up-to-date; and (5) kept in a form
33. Id. at 49th "Whereas."
34. See id. (allowing member states to provide exemption or simplification as
long as ,rocessing does not adversely "affect the rights and freedoms of data
subjects')
35. See id. art. 11, para. 2 (exempting controller from obligation to provide
information when doing so "proves impossible or would involve a disproportionate
effort").
[Vol. 41: . 305
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which permits the identification of data subjects for no longer than
is necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected.3 6
In order to be both fair and legitimate, the Directive requires
that personal data processing meet one of the criteria specifically
listed in Article 7.37 The Directive, however, recognizes that the
needs of different sectors will require individually tailored solu-
tions.38 Therefore, it encourages, mainly through the action of the
member states, the establishment of codes of conduct that take into
account the specific features of the various sectors.39 These codes
may be submitted to the supervisory Authority for a judgment on
their conformity with the national provisions adopted pursuant to
the Directive. 40
3. Security Measures
Protection of data subjects' rights under the Directive requires
data controllers to adopt technical and organizational measures
that will ensure data "security," interpreted as protection from: (1)
accidental or unlawful destruction; (2) accidental loss; (3) unau-
thorized alteration, disclosure or access; and (4) all other unlawful
forms of processing.41
36. Id. art. 6.
37. Id. art. 7. Article 7 states that member states may provide for personal
data processing only if at least one of the following criteria are met: (1) the data
subject consents; (2) processing is necessary for the conclusion or execution of an
agreement binding the data subject; (3) processing is necessary for compliance
with the law; (4) processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data
subject; (5) processing is necessary for the performance of a task that is carried out
in the public interest; or (6) processing is necessary in the legitimate interest of the
controller except when such interests are in contrast with the fundamental rights
and freedoms of the data subject. Id. art. 7(a)-(f).
38. Id. art. 27, para. 1.
39. Id.
40. Id. art. 27, para. 2. Submission to the national Authority is not compul-
sory. See id. (stating that trade associations and other bodies representing other
categories of controllers will "be able to submit" codes to national Authority).
41. Id. art. 17, para. 1. Article 17 also states that "[h]aving regard to the state
of the art and the costs of their implementation, such measures shall ensure a level
of security appropriate to the risks represented by the processing and the nature of
the data to be protected." Id. The Directive's 46th "Whereas" elucidates that:
[Tihe protection of the rights and freedoms of data subjects with regard
to the processing of personal data requires that appropriate technical
and organizational measures be taken, both at the time of the design of
the processing system and at the time of the processing itself, particularly
in order to maintain security and thereby to prevent any unauthorized
processing.
Id. at 46th "Whereas." The provision adds that "it is incumbent on the Member
States to ensure that controllers comply with these measures." Id.
13
d'Afflitto: European Union Directive on Personal Privacy Rights and Computeri
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
4. Notification to the Authority
In exercising its supervisory powers, the Authority relies upon
the controller's notification of its intention to process personal
data. In this way, the required notification ensures disclosure of the
processing operation's purposes and main features. In order to
avoid unnecessary administrative formalities, member states may
provide exemptions from and simplification of the notification re-
quirement.42 At the same time, the Authority will keep a public
register recording all notifications, 43 which data subjects and the
public may freely access. 44
G. The Data Subject's Rights
1. Right to Be Informed
The data subject's right to be informed flows from the control-
ler's obligation to inform; it also substantiates the data subject's
right to access data relating to him or her.
2. Right to Access
Through exercising the right to access, the data subject can
ascertain the accuracy of data relating to her and the lawfulness of
the processing. In practice, this right is exercisable because of the
preliminary notification that every controller must make to the na-
tional Authority before processing personal data. 45 As a result, the
Authority is a collection and distribution center for personal data
information processing. The Authority completes the system of
publicity by establishing a public register of the collected informa-
tion. For the same reasons, the Directive also grants data subjects
the right to know the logic upon which the automatic processing is
based, where the exercise of this right will not adversely affect intel-
lectual property and copyright protection software. 46
The public register, notification to the Authority and organiza-
tion of the Authority itself rely heavily upon automated means. In-
42. Id. art. 18, paras. 2, 4.
43. Id. art. 21, para. 2.
44. See id. (ordering that register may be examined by any member of public).
45. See id. art. 18 (directing controller to notify supervisory authority).
46. Id. art. 12 (stating that "Member States shall guarantee for every data sub-
ject the right to obtain from the controller... without constraint at reasonable
intervals and without excessive delay or expense ...knowledge of the logic in-
volved in any automatic processing of data concerning him"); id. at 41st "Whereas"
(stating that considerations referencing to intellectual property rights and copy-
right protecting software "must not, however, result in the data subject being re-
fused all information").
[Vol. 41: p. 305
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deed, while automated means constitute the primary cause for
personal privacy protection and data privacy-type of laws, they also
represent an indispensable aid for implementation of these laws.
The Directive opens the door for member states to limit data sub-
jects' rights of access and information in order to protect the rights
and freedoms of third parties. 47
3. Right to Object
The data subject has another main right: the right to object to
the processing of data relating to him or her at any time "on com-
pelling legitimate grounds."48 The Directive specifically states that
the data subject has the right to object to the processing (appar-
ently not on a "compelling legitimate ground" but for convenience)
of personal data used in direct marketing.49 This right encom-
passes the related data subject's right "not to be subject to a deci-
sion which produces legal effects concerning him" and "which is
based solely on automated processing of data intended to evaluate
certain personal aspects relating to him."50
4. The Data Subject's Consent
In certain circumstances, the controller of data must obtain
the data subject's consent prior to processing or obtaining personal
data. The Directive defines consent as "any freely given specific
and informed indication of [the data subject's] wishes by which the
data subject signifies his agreement to the personal data relating to
him being processed."51 But the Directive qualifies "consent" dif-
ferently elsewhere in the text. Namely, according to the circum-
stances, it may have to be unambiguous 52 or explicit.53
Some commentators have expressed a concern that requiring
unambiguous consent could contradict certain "opt out" procedures
currently practiced in a few member states. Under opt out proce-
dures, data subjects are fully informed and given an opportunity to
object to the processing or transferring data relating to them.
47. Id. art. 13, para. 1. Article 13 states that restrictions and exemptions to
the rights to access and information, among other rights, are allowed when the
restrictions and exemptions constitute a necessary measure to safeguard: (1) na-
tional security; (2) defense; (3) public security; or (4) prevention, investigation
and prosecution of criminal offenses. Id.
48. Id. art. 14(a).
49. Id. art. 14(b).
50. Id. art. 15, para. 1.
51. Id. art. 2(h).
52. Id. arts. 7, 26.
53. Id. art. 8.
1996]
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H. The Authority
A supervisory Authority ensures compliance with the Direc-
tive's principles and regulations. This Authority is an independent
body, able to investigate, intervene on behalf of and promote legal
actions. When the data subject seeks to challenge the decisions of
the Authority or pursue an alleged violation of the right to privacy
by third parties, the data subject may always seek recourse in an
ordinary jurisdiction.
I. Transborder Data Fow
The Directive explicitly states that, once its provisions have
been adopted, member states "shall neither restrict nor prohibit
the free flow of personal data" among member states for reasons
connected with the protection of the rights and freedoms of natu-
ral persons.54 The Directive prohibits the transfer of personal data
to non-member states not offering adequate personal data protec-
tion.55 The receiving state's protection is adequate only if it is equal
to or higher than that granted to the same data by the origin
state.56 When assessing a third country's protection, the Authority
considers all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer, the
rules of law in force in the third country in question, as well as the
professional rules and security measures. 57 The Convention and
Directive both state this policy of reciprocity, rather than a more
onerous one of license to export, to avoid potentially harmful auto-
54. Id. art. 1, para. 2.
55. See id. art. 25, para. 4 (indicating that if "a third country does not ensure
an adequate level of protection .... Member States shall take the measures neces-
sary to prevent any transfer of data").
56. Id. art. 25, para. 2. This provision specifies that "[t]he adequacy of the
level of protection afforded by a third country shall be assessed in the light of all
the circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation or set of transfer opera-
tions." Id. The provision adds that:
[P]articular consideration shall be given to the nature of the data, the
purpose and the duration of the proposed processing operation or opera-
tions, the country of origin and the country of final destination, the rules
of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third country in question
and the professional rules and security measures which are complied with
in those countries.
Id. This guidance on the meaning of "adequate level of protection" seems to ad-
dress the concerns raised by some European Associations. In particular, these as-
sociations feared that once the Directive was introduced in the member states, the
Directive's level of protection would become the benchmark for adequacy, imped-
ing data flow to jurisdictions not having formal data protection legislation. This
concern related mainly to the United States and Japan, which do not have exten-
sive legislation in the field.
57. Id. art. 25, para. 2.
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matic processing in different countries.58 Under the Directive,
therefore, reciprocity is the only prerequisite for the legitimate
transfer of personal data over E.U. borders.
In certain instances, the Directive provides exceptions to the
reciprocity requirement.59 For example, an exception applies to
data transfers where the parties have a contract necessitating trans-
border personal data flow. The transfer of data among companies
pertaining to the same group, however, does not fall within any of
these exceptions. Consequently, in order for a company subject to
the Directive to continue the personal data transfer with a non-E.U.
affiliate, one of the exceptions exclusively listed in the Directive
must apply (e.g., the adoption by both parties of specific measures,
such as adequate contractual provisions, to remedy the insufficient
protection in the third country).
On the whole, the Directive's exceptions do not address a
number of important issues related to the activity of information
technology and telecommunication service providers. In the con-
text of electronic mail, the service provider and receiver of a
58. A still true excerpt from the Convention states that:
[It] should make no difference for data users or data subjects whether
data processing operations take place in one or in several countries. The
same fundamental rules should apply and data subjects should be given
the same safeguards for the protection of their rights and interests.
In practice, however, data protection grows weaker when the geo-
graphic scope is widened. Concern has been expressed that data users
might seek to avoid data protection controls by moving their operations,
in whole or in part, to "data havens," i.e., countries which have less strict
data protection laws, or none at all.
Explanatory Report of Convention, supra note 15, at 300, intro., para. 9.
59. According to Article 26 of the Directive, the transfer of personal data to a
non-member state that has an inadequate level of protection may take place, by
way of derogation from Artide 25, only if:
(a) the data subject has given his consent unambiguously to the pro-
posed transfer; or
(b) the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between
the data subject and the controller or the implementation of precontrac-
tual measures taken in response to the data subject's request; or
(c) the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a con-
tract concluded in the interest of the data subject between the controller
and a third party; or
(d) the transfer is necessary.., on important public interest grounds, or
for the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims; or
(e) the transfer is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the
data subject; or
(f) the transfer is made from a register which according to laws or regula-
tions is intended to provide information to the public and which is open
to consultation either by the public in general or by any person who can
demonstrate legitimate interest, to the extent that the conditions laid
down in law for consultation are fulfilled in the particular case.
Directive, supra note 4, art. 26, para. 1.
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message are unlikely to have a contractual relationship.60 Similarly,
in such a circumstance, it may be impossible or, at the least very
difficult, to obtain the data subject's consent to the transfer, an-
other of the listed exceptions to the prohibition of transborder data
flow when reciprocity is missing.61
Application of the Directive in other contexts-such as the op-
erations of bank payments, credit card transactions, travel reserva-
tions and even the Global Information Infrastructure-could lead
to the same problems. Notably, however, the E.U. Commission may
verify that a third country's protection is adequate; in which case,
the member states must then adopt proper measures in compliance
with the Commission's decision.
J. Judicial Remedies, Liability and Penalties
Every person is entitled to ajudicial remedy and possible prior
recourse before their national supervisory Authority for any viola-
tion of personal data privacy rights conferred by national law.62 If
the individual suffers damages as a result of an unlawful processing
of personal data, he or she can receive compensation from the con-
troller.65 The Directive requires member states to adopt suitable
sanctions for infringement of laws adopted pursuant to its
provisions.64
IV. CONCLUSION
Europe's experience relating to data privacy matters during
the last fifteen years or so-especially as it relates to the creation of
the Directive on personal data privacy protection-indicates that,
in order to adequately safeguard data privacy rights, certain impor-
tant issues must be fully resolved. First, there is a continuing need
for an overarching data privacy protection law. Second, there is the
need for a system that successfully balances the rights to privacy,
freedom of information, economic and social progress, and trade
60. See id. art. 26, para. 1 (b), (c) (requiring contractual relationship for ex-
ception to apply). It is also questionable that paragraph 1 (c) covers the example
re erred to in the text. See id. art. 26, para. 1 (c).
61. Id. art. 26, para. 1 (a) (requiring, as case of derogation from Article 25,
that "the data subject has given his consent unambiguously to the proposed
transfer").
62. Id. art. 22.
63. Id. art. 23, para. 1. The controller can escape liability if he can demon-
strate that he is not at fault for the event that caused the claimant damage. Id. art.
23, para. 2.
64. Id. art. 24.
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expansion. Third, there is the need for actual protection of data
privacy rights by a protection system that is not financially and ad-
ministratively convoluted or onerous. Finally, there remains the
need for coordination and harmonization among states, third
countries and other international institutions on how to handle
data privacy issues.
19
d'Afflitto: European Union Directive on Personal Privacy Rights and Computeri
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol41/iss1/7
